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Abstract: The Black Sea region has strategic geopolitical importance where the routes of Europe, the Caucasus,
Asia, and the Middle East intersect. Ensuring stability and security in the Black Sea area is essential for emerging
new security architecture. In search of balance, the challenges are met by the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) and the
deepening of strategic relations with the United Arab Emirates. The UAE, anchored in the Euro-Atlantic
partnership and with extensive influence, emerges as an interesting strategic partner. When analysing the Three
Seas Initiative, it should be noted that the United States of America joined the implementation of 3SI, seeing it as
an opportunity to pursue American interests in LNG markets, and in a broader geopolitical dimension, combining
this initiative with projects in the Middle East. This research paper is the first to analyse the foreign and security
policy of the two Black Sea countries, Bulgaria, and Romania that participate in the Three Seas Initiative, from
the geostrategic perspective and relations with the United Arab Emirates. The research work is based on
empirical research, and the results of which are largely derived from 10 years of direct observation, as well as
the participation of the author of the article in many initiatives related to cooperation between all 3SI countries
with the United Arab Emirates, among others as an Ambassador, Senior Advisor at Dubai Expo 2020.
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Introduction
The Three Seas Initiative (3SI), announced in 2015 and formally initiated in 2016, is a new
form of strategic cooperation between the 12 countries located between the Adriatic, the Baltic,
and the Black Seas. Due to the immediate vicinity of this area with Russia, Turkey, the
Mediterranean basin, and the proximity of the Middle East, as well as the strategic activity of the
USA and China with all countries of this initiative, 3SI has a global dimension. The Black Sea
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region has strategic geopolitical importance where the routes of Europe, the Caucasus, Asia, and
the Middle East intersect. Therefore, this region shows both great opportunities for beneficial
cooperation with Asia and the Middle East and vulnerability to threats arising from these areas. It
is of key importance for the stabilisation and security of Europe, including the Common Foreign
and Security Policy of the European Union. In this region, there are still active conflicts in Crimea
and Georgia, and competition for strategic energy projects. On the other hand, Russia, and Turkey
conduct military operations in Syria. In addition, Bulgaria and Romania, the Black Sea countries,
the European Union, and NATO members have been participating in the Three Seas Initiative
(3SI), being of fundamental importance for its implementation. Thus, the Black Sea region is an
area of rivalry between the USA, Russia, Turkey, and the EU with the mutual influence of the
Middle East (Joja, 2020).
Through the annexation of Crimea, Russia acquired most of the Ukrainian oil and gas fields
located in the Black Sea. On the other hand, Turkey, by sending refugees from the Middle East to
Bulgaria, may contribute to the destabilisation of this country with consequences for the entire EU
area. Therefore, ensuring stability and security is essential in the Black Sea area to the emerging
new security architecture. Conflicts between Turkey and other NATO members over its military
engagement in the Mediterranean Sea, along with Russia, as well as the lack of unanimity among
European Union members on the future of the Western Balkans, and the rivalry between the USA
and China in terms of infrastructure investment, will contribute to many tensions in the structure
of the global order. In such a situation, in search of a balance of power, these challenges are met
by the Three Seas Initiative and the deepening of strategic relations with the United Arab Emirates.
Russia is demonstrating its imperial goals by increasing its military forces as well as its
control over territories in the Black Sea region. This game is very dangerous for the entire
architecture of global security. Russia has taken actions not only against countries aspiring to the
Euro-Atlantic political, economic, and military structures, but also tries to get the support of
Bulgaria, the EU, and NATO member, or Turkey, which is a member of the Alliance North
Atlantic and allows Russia to take a hegemonic position in the region (Joja, 2019, pp. 2-3). In such
an arrangement, the allied solidarity, which is the basis of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation,
is naturally broken. Moreover, Russia’s increasing influence in the Black Sea basin is part of a
broader Eurasian strategy. It is an element serving to increase presence, influence, and power in
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the Mediterranean region as well as in the Middle East. One example is Russia’s military
cooperation with Turkey in Syria or Russia’s activity in Libya in another constellation of interests.
Turkey joined NATO in 1952 to stop the imperial plans of the Soviet Union towards the
Black Sea and the Middle East. Turkey has always wanted a dominant position in the region.
Several months after the collapse of the Soviet Union, to maintain Turkey’s leading role and
importance in the region, in 1992 Ankara initiated the establishment of the Black Sea Economic
Cooperation Organisation (BSEC). However, it was not an effective tool for implementing
Turkey’s foreign and security policy. Therefore, after nearly 20 years, the concept of ‘strategic
depth’ of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) was adopted, which is now consistently being
implemented. One of the assumptions of this doctrine is to use the geographical location of Turkey
to build the main energy corridors in its area (Krzymowski, 2019, p. 322). In 2015, after the
Turkish military forces shot down a Russian attack aircraft, the situation between Russia and
Turkey was very tense. However, fairly quickly, after the failed military coup attempt in 2016 and
the dramatic rise of anti-American sentiment in Turkey, which led to the USA being perceived as
the main security threat, Ankara decided to enter into a strategic alliance with Moscow.
This article is the first to analyse the foreign and security policy of the two Black Sea
countries that participate in the Three Seas Initiative, Bulgaria, and Romania, from the geostrategic
perspective and relations with the United Arab Emirates. The research work is based on empirical
research, and the results which are largely derived from 10 years of direct observation, as well as
the participation of the author of the article in many initiatives related to cooperation between the
countries of the Three Seas Initiative and the United Arab Emirates, including as Ambassador,
Senior Advisor is Dubai Expo 2020 also responsible for the strategies and dynamization of all 3SI
countries (except Poland) in UAE relations.
Therefore, the methods of empirical research, with particular emphasis on qualitative
methods and inductive reasoning, were considered the most appropriate in finding an answer to
the research question about the role and importance of cooperation between Bulgaria and Romania
with the United Arab Emirates for the effective implementation of the Three Seas Initiative. For
this purpose, the methods of document content analysis, case studies, comparative analysis,
observation, and interviews were used. In this context, game theory and the theory of
institutionalism were also useful. In addition, the author adopted Wendt’s (1987) concepts,
combining rationalist and reflection approaches. Thus, this article, using the above-mentioned
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methods, both explains international relations in the topic discussed and shows the basis of the
values of interests that shape changes. In addition, scientific realism combined with liberal
institutionalism was applied in complement. The author of this article shows that despite the
European integration process, including the Three Seas Initiative (all states are EU members), it
should be recognized that states with their interests are the most important. Therefore, states, being
rational entities, should be primarily analysed. In this way, it will be possible to explain the
ongoing integration processes and see the real game of interests.
Bulgaria and Romania relations with the United Arab Emirates
Romania established diplomatic relations with the United Arab Emirates on August 1,
1989. Moreover, in less than a year, in June 1990, the Romanian Embassy was opened in the UAE
capital, Abu Dhabi. Already in May 1991, the Romanian Prime Minister, Petre Roman, paid an
official visit to the United Arab Emirates. On October 19, 1991, diplomatic relations were
established between Bulgaria and the United Arab Emirates. In January 1992, the Romanian
Consulate General in Dubai began its activity. On the other hand, in April 1993, the official visit
of the President of Romania, Ion Iliescu, took place in the UAE. Thus, the first years of diplomatic
relations were marked by visits to the United Arab Emirates at the highest level of Romanian
leaders, including the president and prime minister. However, the following years of relations
between the Romania and the UAE were characterised by their stable development, with
consultations between the ministries of foreign affairs of both countries, but without visits at the
highest level. In the case of Bulgaria, the 90s was a period that is not characterized by any dynamics
in relations between the two countries.
The beginning of the 21st century brought more interest to Bulgaria and Romania in
bilateral relations with the United Arab Emirates and vice versa. Bulgaria’s diplomatic mission, in
the form of the General Counsellor in Dubai, was opened in 2001. The relationship between
Romania and the United Arab Emirates once again reached a deeper level when in February 2002
the Romanian President, Ion Iliescu, re-elected to the office, paid another official visit to the UAE.
This presidential visit influenced the decision by the Emirati company Dubai Ports World on a
strategic investment in Romania. A few months after the war started in Iraq, in November 2003
Bulgarian President Georgi Parvanov paid an official visit to the United Arab Emirates. At the
same time, the Dubai-based DP World corporation dealing with cargo logistics and servicing
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seaport terminals received in November 2003 a long-term license to operate the Constanta South
Container Terminal (CSCT) SRL. The facility is a modern and most important container terminal
located in the Black Sea. This terminal is crucial not only for Romania’s needs but also for a large
part of Central and Eastern Europe. Therefore, it fits perfectly into the strategies of the Three Seas
Initiative, for which the transport and logistics issue is one of the priorities. Moreover, due to the
fact that it offers a fairly quick connection between Central and Eastern Europe and the Far East
(DP World Constanta, 2020), it also corresponds to the 17 + 1 strategy. As a result of strategic
investment and the deepening of relations between Romania and the United Arab Emirates, the
UAE Embassy was established in 2004 in the Romanian capital, Bucharest. Over the next more
than 10 years, relations between Romania and the UAE developed very well and steadily. It should
be stated that in this period the relationship between Bulgaria as well as Romania and the UAE
were not characterised by greater dynamics, both in the political, economic, or military dimension.
However, it is worth emphasizing the visit in June 2009 paid by H.H. Sheikh Abdullah Bin Zayed
Al Nahyan, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the United Arab
Emirates.
In 2014, due to the events in the Black Sea, in Ukraine, i.e. the annexation of Crimea, the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe decided to tighten regional cooperation. In this context,
in 2015, the concept of closer cooperation between the Adriatic Sea, the Baltic Sea, and the Black
Sea emerged. At the same time, it should be recognized new impulses for their further deepening
relations between Bulgaria and Romania with the United Arab Emirates. In May 2015, the Prime
Minister of Romania, Victor Ponta, paid an official visit to the United Arab Emirates. During this
visit and the talks at the highest level, the UAE’s intention to undertake further investments in
Romania, in particular in the agricultural sector, was announced. Moreover, the following
agreements were signed during the Romanian Prime Minister’s stay in the United Arab Emirates,
i.e.an Agreement on mutual visa waiver for holders of diplomatic and special passports, and a
Memorandum of Understanding regarding political consultations, higher education, and scientific
research (MOFAIC, 2015). Consequently, a few months later, in January 2016, the Sharjah-based
group Chemie-Tech DMCC announced its decision to invest $ 63 million in Romania, in a factory
that specialises in recycling used oil from the automotive industry. Moreover, it was emphasised
that the UAE company plans to open a nationwide used oil collection network in Romania. It
should be underlined that the project is the first investment of this type in Central and Eastern
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Europe (Banila, 2016). At the same time, in January, Bulgarian Minister of Information
Technology and Communications, Ivaylo Moskovski came to Dubai. During the visit, after a
meeting with the UAE Minister of Economy, Sultan bin Saeed Al Mansouri, an Agreement on air
services was signed (WAM, 2016).
Map 1: Three Seas Initiative countries

Source: https://www.gisreportsonline.com/97,i.html

The idea of closer cooperation between 12 countries located between the Adriatic Sea,
Baltic Sea, and the Black Sea was formalized on August 25, 2016, by a signed Joint Declaration
establishing the Three Seas Initiative. In October 2016 the UAE Minister of Economy visited
Bulgaria. After the meeting with his counterpart, Bozhidar Lukarski, an Agreement on economic
co-operation was signed (Tfaham, 2016). In the following year, 2017, Bulgarian Minister of
Economy, Bozhidar Lukarski came to the United Arab Emirates, where, in addition to meeting
with UAE Minister of Economy, Sultan Bin Saeed Al Mansouri, further were signed Agreements
for Air Services and Establish Economic Relations. In April 2018, the Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ekaterina Zakharieva, came to the United Arab Emirates. During this
visit, an MoU on political consultations between the two ministries of foreign affairs was signed.
Moreover, the official opening ceremony of the Bulgarian Embassy in Abu Dhabi took place. At
the same time, in April 2018, the UAE Minister of Education, Hussain Al Hammadi, visited
Romania to deepen relations between the two countries in the field of science and research. In
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order to make joint decisions, during the visit, a meeting was held with the Deputy Prime Minister
of Romania, Viorel Stefan, Minister of National Education, Valentin Popa, and the heads of
universities as well as research institutions (MOFAIC, 2018a). One month later, the UAE Minister
of State, Sultan bin Ahmad Sultan Al Jaber arrived in Romania to chair together with the Minister
of Foreign Affairs of Romania, Teodor Melescanu, the first-ever meeting of the UAE-Romania
Joint Committee in Bucharest. The partners emphasised the need to further use the strategic
position of both countries, especially in the context of the development of trade. In addition,
numerous agreements were signed during the visit, including an MoU founding the UAE-Romania
Joint Committee, an MoU on cooperation, and exchange of media information between the
Emirates News Agency, the WAM, and the Romania News Agency. Moreover, an MoU on
agricultural cooperation, an MoU on cooperation in the sports sector, an MoU to enhance bilateral
investments and cultural cooperation have been signed. In addition, the UAE-based Al Dahra
Agriculture company has started to make agricultural investments in the Black Sea region. This
initiative is in line with the United Arab Emirates’ strategy of ensuring food security, a country
that imports over 90% of its food. It is also worth emphasising that the chairman of the UAE
delegation during his stay in Romania met with all of the most important people in the country
(MOFAIC, 2018b). As a consequence, a few months later, in September 2018, the Ruler’s
Representative in the Al Dhafra Region in the UAE, H.H. Sheikh Hamdan bin Zayed Al Nahyan
came to Romania. In order to deepen relations, especially trade and investment, during the visit,
meetings were held with, among others, President Klaus Iohannis and Prime Minister Viorica
Dancila (Alfaham and Mohamed, 2018). Continuing relations at the highest level, the following
month the Romanian Prime Minister Vasilica Viorica Dăncilă paid a visit to the United Arab
Emirates, along with a large delegation, including ministers and businessmen. During a successful
visit, the ministers of foreign affairs of both countries signed an Agreement between the two
governments on reciprocal property ownership rights for the diplomatic missions. The partners
have agreed to work even deeper, especially between various clusters, including automotive
construction, high tech, agriculture and food, energy, aerospace, mechanical, electrical, creative
and cultural sectors, tourism, IT&C (including blockchain technology) health and medical
sciences, constructions, maritime, textile, furniture, green energy, and logistics. As a result of
dynamic relations at the highest level, both parties expressed their willingness to conclude a
Strategic Economic Partnership in the near future (MOFAIC, 2018c). In October 2018, the Prime
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Minister of Bulgaria, Boyko Borisov, paid an official visit to the United Arab Emirates. During
the visit, the leaders of both countries decided to take action to prepare an agreement on strategic
cooperation and to strengthen relations in all areas of cooperation, especially political, economic,
security, cultural, and sports (Embassy of the Republic of Bulgaria, 2018a). In addition, during the
conversation with the Prime Minister of Bulgaria, Boyko Borisov, the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi
and Deputy Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, H.H. Sheikh Mohammed Bin Zayed Al
Nahyan stated that they identified many common strategic interests in the field of economy,
agriculture, construction, technology, and the military industry. In the context of the Three Seas
Initiative and the role and importance of Bulgaria not only in the Balkan region but also for the
Middle East, the interviewees emphasised the special importance of the transport corridors that
Prime Minister Borisov has been negotiating with other Balkan countries. In this sense, the leaders
of both countries underlined that the strategic location of Bulgaria should be used for mutual
benefits, as well as in a broader geopolitical sense for the development of trade and economic
agreements of the United Arab Emirates in Europe (Embassy of the Republic of Bulgaria, 2018b).
As a result of the visit of the Prime Minister of Bulgaria, Boyko Borisov to the UAE, the areas of
cooperation between the two countries were significantly deepened and expanded. Only a few
weeks later, further official visits were made to the United Arab Emirates. One of them was the
visit of the Minister of Education of Bulgaria, Krasimir Valchev. Another visit of the Minister of
Interior Affairs, Mladen Marinov from General Attorney Sotir Tsatsarov. In addition, the UAE
Minister of Food Security, Mariam Al Muhairi, arrived in Bulgaria that same month. Just two
months later, at the beginning of February 2019, the Minister of Interior Affairs, Mladen Marinov,
and the General Attorney, Sotir Tsatsarov again visited the United Arab Emirates (Sofia News
Agency, 2019). In March 2019 the Emirati company DP World Constanta, managing the strategic
sea terminal Constanta South Container Terminal (CSCT) SRL in Romania, received a license
renewal for another 30 years, i.e. until 2049 (MOFAIC, 2019a). Thanks to this decision, DP World
from Dubai will have an important role and significance in the implementation of some strategic
projects of the Three Seas Initiative for a long, crucial period. The implementation of the 3SI road
connection via Carpathia, which will run near Constanta, will be another strategic value for the
Constant South Container Terminal.
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Map 2: Three Seas Initiative projects

Source:

https://www.gisreportsonline.com/regional-integration-at-the-three-seas-

summit,economy,2683,report.html
Aiming to further deepen the relations between the states and concluding a strategic
partnership, in June 2019 the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, H.H.
Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan came to Romania. During this visit, His Highness held
talks with, among others, the Prime Minister Vasilica Viorica Dăncilă and the Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Bulgaria, Teodor Meleșcanu. The partners reviewed potential cooperation projects,
including in the field of trade, agriculture, infrastructure, transportation, and Information and
Communications Technology (MOFAIC, 2019b). In June 2019, a very important visit to Bulgaria
took place, paid by the UAE Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, H.H.
Sheikh Abdullah Bin Zayed Al Nahyan, serving to clarify the scope of the strategic partnership.
Moreover, during H.H. stay in Sofia, the UAE Minister, together with the Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Bulgaria, officially opened the Embassy of the United Arab Emirates (Hussein and
Salman, 2019). In order to deepen economic relations, the Deputy Prime Minister for Economic
and Social Policy Mariyana Nikolova visited the UAE in February 2020. During the meeting with
the UAE Minister of Economy, Sultan Bin Saeed Al Mansouri, they discussed many important
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issues, including supporting small and medium-sized enterprises and creating a joint venture (Sofia
News Agency, 2020).
Findings
After 2011, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe gained a much more important
role and position in the foreign and security policy of the United Arab Emirates. Studies of twelve
countries of the Three Seas Initiative and the most important official bilateral visits demonstrate
that in the last 20 years every member of this project has recorded a visit at the highest level in
relation with the UAE.
The charts below show the dynamics of the most important official bilateral visits, at the
level of heads of state and government as well as ministers of foreign affairs, the economy as well
as members of the royal family holding high state positions were taken into account.
Figure 1: The most important official bilateral visits 2011-2015
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Source: Own study based on data from government institutions.
In the period 2011-2015, Bulgaria recorded one of the lowest levels of relations with the
United Arab Emirates in terms of top-level visits. On the other hand, Romania showed the
dynamics of bilateral official meetings slightly higher than the average of all countries.
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Figure 2: The most important official bilateral visits 2016-2020
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Source: Own study based on data from government institutions.
After 2015, during the implementation of the Three Seas Initiative, the vast majority of 3SI
members demonstrate great dynamics. Bulgaria is the clear leader of this ranking. On the other
hand, Romania recorded the same level of dynamics of official visits.
An analysis of the foreign and security policies of all partners, as well as their geostrategic
situations and challenges, demonstrate that there is still a large potential for expansion and
deepening of relations. It should also be noted that there has been a huge increase in top-level visits
between Bulgaria and the United Arab Emirates since 2015, which may be explained by the need
to diversify strategic alliances. Bulgaria recorded the highest number of top-level visits of all 12
Three Seas Initiative countries. The situation of Romania, which demonstrates the same level of
dynamics of visits with the UAE in the last two decades, is the result of a lack of recognition of
the need to conclude new strategic alliances. Romanian foreign and security policy wants to focus
primarily on relations with the USA and strengthening the role and position within NATO and the
European Union. However, it should also be emphasised that for both countries of the Three Seas
Initiative, which are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the EU, the United
Arab Emirates is a country focused on close, strategic cooperation with the Euro-Atlantic area. In
2004, the same year Bulgaria and Romania joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and the
United Arab Emirates became a member of the NATO Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. Besides, it
should be noted that the United Arab Emirates is the first Arab country to have an ambassador
accredited to NATO. Moreover, the UAE is deepening its relations with the European Union, for
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which the United Arab Emirates has become a strategic partner, as emphasised by the leaders of
various European Union institutions. In addition, the United Arab Emirates creating a global new
model of a green economy may be an interesting partner for Bulgaria and Romania in the
implementation of the SDGs (Krzymowski, 2020, pp. 213-214). Therefore, the United Arab
Emirates is an important strategic partner of the 3SI countries in the Black Sea region.
Geostrategic dimension
When Ukraine and Georgia chose the Euro-Atlantic course of foreign and security policy,
traditionally Bulgaria and Turkey began to support Russia in strategic projects (Joja, 2019, p. 14).
Among all the Black Sea countries, Romania is a leader in spreading Euro-Atlantic values.
Black Sea Strategy
The beginning of the 21st century is a period of important Romanian initiatives concerning
the security of the region. Romania’s foreign and security policy was based on two strategic goals,
i.e. membership in NATO, which took place in March 2004, and accession to the European Union.
On the one hand, this was due to the beginning of an increase in military power, influence, and
demonstration by Russia, and on the other hand, it was important due to the instability of the
Middle East and finally the beginning of the war in the not-so-distant Iraq in 2003. Under these
circumstances, Romania intended to take an active position by initiating and organising the Black
Sea Forum for Partnership and Dialogue (BSF) in Bucharest in June 2006, with the security of the
region as one of its most important goals. A few months later, after Romania joined the European
Union on January 1, 2007, this initiative became an EU project. In April 2007, during the German
presidency in the European Union, Romania managed to push through the Black Sea Synergy
project, which was to become an important element defining the EU’s strategy towards the region.
However, just a year later, on May 27, 2008, Poland and Sweden, as part of the European Union,
initiated the Eastern Partnership, emphasising the EU’s special relations with six countries, i.e.
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, which were included in the Black
Sea Forum for Partnership and Dialogue (BSF) and Black Sea Synergy. Moreover, the Eastern
Partnership has raised concerns about competition with these initiatives. Therefore, the European
Parliament underlined the need to create a similar like the Mediterranean Union - the Union for
the Black Sea (Piskorska, 2012, p. 190). As a result, as Joja (2019, p. 8) points out, both Romania’s
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initiatives regarding the Black Sea basin did not bring the expected result. The European Union
has not adopted a Black Sea Strategy. Besides, internal problems did not favour the effectiveness
of its foreign policy and actions on the European Union forum. However, before the NATO summit
in 2015 in Bucharest, Romania and Poland initiated cooperation of nine countries of NATO’s
eastern flank (B9) to deepen security cooperation not only within the North Atlantic Alliance but
also in cooperation with the EU. In 2016, during the NATO summit in Warsaw, Romania took the
initiative to establish a regional Black Sea Force. However, Bulgaria immediately announced that
it was not interested in the project. In this way, Bulgaria blocked the implementation of this
initiative, supporting a strong security guarantee by North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and
enabling closer cooperation with countries aspiring to NATO from the region, i.e. Ukraine and
Georgia. Additionally, Bulgaria has consistently continued its close strategic relations with Russia
not only in the area of economy, investment, industry, and tourism but also by supporting Russian
energy projects that make Europe dependent on gas from Russia through Turkish Stream, South
Stream or Turkish Stream. In 2016, Poland and Croatia initiated the Three Seas Initiative (3SI), in
which the Black Sea countries are an important part of it. The dynamics of this initiative shows its
great potential and effectiveness in influencing both EU partners and the international
environment.
Since 2011, Turkey has been taking active military operations in the Middle East and North
Africa (MENA), mainly in Libya, Syria, Qatar, and Yemen. In addition, Turkey has established in
Somalia the largest overseas military camp and in Sudan it leases the island of Suakin, deepening
strategic relations with the country. For over 10 years, Turkey’s foreign and security policy
strategy has been based on the ideology of political Islam, which is operationally implemented
primarily by the Justice and Development Party (AKP). Its goal is to establish Turkey as the
political leader of the wider Muslim world (Occhiuto and Cafiero, 2020). Turkey, taking advantage
of Qatar’s conflict with other GCC members, has installed military forces in the Tariq Ibn Ziyad
base in Qatar. Moreover, in Iraq, Ankara has established around 20 small bases, mostly of an
intelligence nature. Additionally, in northern Syria, Turkey has six bases with a significant number
of soldiers on a rotating basis. Moreover, Turkish diplomacy is a very active instrument in
implementing geostrategic goals (Pivariu, 2020).
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Bulgaria’s foreign and security policy (2017-2021)
Bulgaria’s current foreign and security policy is implemented on the basis of the
Government Program 2017-2021, which indicates that although active participation in the
European Union and NATO is the highest priority, the document emphasises that both
organisations do not always define Bulgaria’s coherent roles and international position as well as
geopolitical interests. In addition, the geostrategic situation requires taking into account many
factors, including Brexit, the migration crisis from the Middle East and North Africa, growing
populism in the region, terrorist threats, and the uncertain structure of relations between the USA,
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and the EU. Moreover, Bulgaria is dependent on Russia in the
energy area. In such a situation, the Bulgarian government emphasises the need to continue
strengthening relations with Russia, while trying to obtain the position of a mediator in the Black
Sea region between Euro-Atlantic partners and Russia (Kandilarov, 2019, pp. 1,3). It is worth
noting that when analysing the Balkans in terms of energy security, as much as 80% of the energy
infrastructure belongs to Bulgaria with the possibility of affecting a large part of Europe.
Therefore, this issue has the highest priority of Bulgaria’s economic, foreign, and security policy.
In 2019, Bulgaria took some steps to diversify its energy supply. On May 31, 2019, the Minister
of Energy of Bulgaria, Temenuzhka Petkova, announced that in June 2019, using the Greek LNG
terminal in Revithoussa and the Greek-Bulgarian gas connection (Sidirokastro-Kułat), American
LNG would flow to Bulgaria (Seroka, 2019b). On September 18, 2019, the state-owned company
Bulgartransgaz, responsible for the gas transmission system, signed a contract with the Saudi
Arkad consortium for the construction of approx. 500 km of the second section of the Turk Stream
gas pipeline connecting Bulgaria and Serbia. The project is to be put into service in 2021 and its
cost is estimated at EUR 1.1 billion. However, most of this amount is to be covered by a Saudi
corporation, which will receive transit fees for 10 years after the pipeline will launch. Bulgaria,
being completely dependent on Russian gas supplies, took some further steps in 2019 to try to
change the situation, by acquiring American LNG from Greece and starting the construction of a
new interconnector with Greece (IGB), which should be put into service after 2021. However, it
should be noted that this project can only provide 9% of Bulgaria’s gas needs (Seroka, 2019a).
Due to the direct sensitivity of Bulgaria’s politics and economy to the increasing competition
between Euro-Atlantic partners and Russia in the region, the country is increasingly interested in
cooperation with China under the 16+ 1 platform (now, after Greece’s accession: 17 +1), especially
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in the context of Silk Road project. It is worth mentioning the strategic document ‘Vision for
Bulgaria’, prepared by the Bulgarian Socialist Party, which is currently the second power in
parliament, with an upward trend in support. This vision emphasises the need to deepen strategic
relations with China and to establish a Global Partnership Centre in Sofia (Kandilarov, 2019, p.
5). Moreover, Bulgaria would like to use the IGB to be a Balkan Gas Hub, which would be used
to transmit gas from directions other than Russia, and which would be directed to Central European
countries. In this sense, a link between Bulgaria and Romania has been in operation since 2016,
and the construction of the first section of the BRUA gas pipeline (Bulgaria-Romania-HungaryAustria) has been underway since June 2018. This is taking place under the influence of American
lobbying, in the face of Russian influence (Seroka, 2019b). So, there is a huge competition going
on between the USA and Russia to shape the energy security of a large part of Europe for many
years. Moreover, the United States of America is involved in the Three Seas Initiative, for which
energy security is one of its strategic priorities.
Romanian National Security Strategy (2020–2024)
On June 30, 2020, the Romanian parliament almost unanimously adopted the new National
Security Strategy for 2020–2024, which sets the foundation for deepening strategic relations with
the United States of America and strengthening its role and position in the European Union and
NATO. For the first time, in Romania’s security strategy, Russia was repeatedly explicitly
mentioned as a country destabilising the situation in the Black Sea region. Romania recognises
that Russia wants to use the EU’s European Security and Defence Policy and attempts to build
European strategic autonomy as a platform for implementing its foreign and security policy
(Krzymowski, 2009, p. 30). Therefore, the strategy provides for actions aimed at increasing the
US military presence in Romania. For this reason, the document emphasises the need to expand
Romania’s defence potential. Analysing the broader geostrategic aspect of military cooperation
between the USA and Romania, in 2005 the two countries signed an agreement to provide
Romania’s military infrastructure to the US military forces, which is used for operations in the
Middle East. It is worth mentioning that since 2007, Mihail Kogălniceanu’s air force base has been
located in Romania, near Constanta, where 1,300 American soldiers are stationed rotating. In
addition, this base is an important multimodal transport hub for US military forces. In addition, its
expansion and modernisation are planned, for which the Romanian government wants to allocate
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over 2.5 billion euros. Another important part of the United States of America activity is its military
presence in the Air Force base at Câmpia Turzii, in which the Romanian government plans to
invest € 200 million, with additional USA support of $ 130 million, to increase its operational
capabilities. In addition, US soldiers use, among others, training grounds in Babadag, Cincu, and
Smârdan. Meanwhile, since 2016, Devesel has three SM-3 missile batteries, the American antimissile defence system, and several hundred American sailors. In addition, an armoured battalion
of the American armed forces has been stationed on a rotating basis since 2017 under an agreement
with the USA. It should be emphasised that currently, Romania is primarily seeking to establish a
permanent military presence of the US troops, rather than a rotational one (Całus, 2020). Also,
worth emphasising is Romania’s close military relations and military exercises with France and
Germany, including those beyond the NATO formula, such as the Romanian French naval
exercises, or the integration of the Romanian 81st Mechanised Brigade with the German Rapid
Response Forces Division. In this cooperation, both France and Germany are seeking Romanian
arms contracts (Pieńkowski, 2019).
Conclusion
From the beginning of 2011, i.e. the start of the so-called Arab Spring, relations between
the United Arab Emirates and the European Union members, especially with the countries of
Central and Eastern Europe, intensified. Additionally, this process was favoured by the situation
related to the implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon, including the establishment of new
instruments of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the change of priorities in the United
States of America foreign and security policy, i.e. transferring political, economic and security
strategic priorities from the Euro-Atlantic and Middle East area to the Pacific region.
The transport and economic strategic element of the Three Seas Initiative made it possible
to connect Europe, the Baltic Sea with North and Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as the GCC countries
through the Black Sea region. Thus, Bulgaria and Romania are important parts of the 3SI.
Moreover, with the support of the United States of America, they may not only constitute a crucial
element of the European political, economic, and security structure but also have a significance in
the global dimension, especially in the area of North Africa and the Middle East (MENA),
including GCC (Repetowicz, 2017). When analysing the Three Seas Initiative, it should be noted
that the USA is interested in the implementation of 3SI, seeing it as an opportunity to pursue
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American interests in the LNG sector, and in a broader geopolitical dimension, combining this
initiative with projects in the Middle East.
Analysing both the new National Security Strategy for 2020-2024 and the decisions and
actions taken by the Romanian government and president, it should be emphasised that in the
increasingly aggressive rivalry between the USA and China, Romania will definitely support the
United States of America, believing that this country, in the long run, will remain the most
influential country in the world. Especially since July 2020, the USA decided to strengthen the
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s south-eastern flank, including the Black Sea basin, and to
increase the presence of American troops in this region. Moreover, in the emerging new global
security architecture, a decisive factor will be the new identification of global interests by state
actors, resulting in a new constellation of not only interests but alliances (Całus, 2020). Bulgaria,
experiencing the dynamics of contemporary international relations, their multi-polarities, the
complexity of the contemporary world economy, and the emerging new global security
architecture, aims to diversify alliances. In this sense, the United Arab Emirates, anchored in the
Euro-Atlantic partnership and possessing extensive influence, appears as an interesting strategic
partner.
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